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JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE.'
RECENT CASES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
Loeb vs. Jennings, Ga., 67 S. E. 101. I. Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
Where duly authorized by the municipal charter and ordinances, a sentence by
a recorder which requires the person convicted of a violation of a penal ordinance to work on the streets or other public works of a city is not void or
illegal on the ground that it is violative of par. 9, sec. I, art. I, of the Constitution of this state (Civ. Code, 1895, sec. 57o6), which declares that excessive
fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. It cannot
be said, in view of the character of the offense committed, that the fine of $5o0
The eighth amendwhich was imposed was so excessive as to be unconstitutional.
ment of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that "excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted" (Civ. Code, 1895, sec. 6021), refers to power exercised by the
2. Due
government of the United States, and not to those of the individual states
Process of Law. A sentence imposed on one convicted of violating a municipal
ordinance, which required.him to pay a fine and also to work on the streets or
other public places of the city, was not violative of the provisions contained in
the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution of the United States, that "no
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, . . . nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The provisions of the Constitution of this state that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, except by due process of law" (Const., art. I, sec. I, par. 3), does not
guarantee a trial by jury to one charged with the violation of a valid municipal
ordinance; but he may be summarily tried and convicted, without a jury, in a
police court having jurisdiction to try petty offenses against the peace, good
order and security of the municipality; and this is true, although, under such
ordinance and the charter of the city, the offender is sentenced to pay a fine
of $5oo and also to work upon the streets or other public places of the city for
30 days. Such a trial without a jury, and the sentence so imposed, are notl
violative of the provision of the Constitution of the United States (Amend. 14)
which declares: "Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." 3. Invohntary Servitude. To punish
such an offender by confining him at labor under municipal control is noti
obnoxious to the constitutional inhibition against involuntary servitude save as
a punishment for crime after legal conviction therefor. Even if there were
I.

'Furnished by Professors C. H. Huberich and Chester G. Vernier.
These cases have been digested from the advance sheets of the National
Reporter system, published in the period from March 2o to May io, igio. By
courtesy of the West Publishing Company of St. Paul free use has been made
of the head notes in that edition of the reports.
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some acts of misconduct shown on the part of persons in charge of those convicted of violating municipal ordinances, the evidence was not such as to render
the conviction or sentence illegal, or show that it was error on the part of the
judge presiding at the hearing upon the return of the writ of habeas corpus to
decline to discharge the applicant, who has been so convicted, from custody.
11.

FEDERAL CRtInmiAL LAW.

United States vs. Martin, 176 Fed. no. Offenses Against United States.
There are no common law offenses against the United States, and the courts of
the United States have only such jurisdiction as Congress has conferred on them
to try and punish such acts as it shall have previously declared to be crimes and
fixed the penalty therefor.
III.

PUNISHMET.

State vs. McKellar, S. C., 67 S. E. 314. Concurrent Sentences. Where
several sentences are imposed for separate and distinct offenses after conviction
thereof on separate indictments, or on several ccunts in the same indictment,
the sentences run concurrently, unless the intention that one should begin at
the expiration of the other is expressed.
State vs. Kirby, Miss., 51 So. 811. Pardon. Acts, 19o8, c. 109, sec. 3, authorizing the board of supervisors to discharge a convict from jail, if unable to
labor from bodily infirmity apparently permanent, violates Const. 1890, sec. 124,
conferring on the governor the sole power to pardon in criminal and penal cases.
IV.

JUVENILE COURTS.

State vs. Prater, La., 51 So. 647. Sentence. Act No. 83 of 19o8, creating
juvenile courts, and repealing all laws or parts of laws in conflict therewith,
provided an exclusive method for the trial of juvenile delinquents, and conferred
on the judge of the court broad discretion as to the place of punishment, not
limited by section 17, declaring that, where the delinquency charged is an act
which would, if committed by an adult, amount to a crime punishable at hard
labor, the judge may commit the child to the State Reformatory; and hence
the fact that there was no such institution in the state did not authorize the
trial of a youth 17 years of age for burglary and larceny in the district court
sitting for the ordinary trial of criminals, and, on conviction, a sentence to thc
penitentiary.
V.

MERGER OF OFFENSES.

Sharp vs. State, Ga., 67 S. E. 699. The rule of the common law that
misdemeanor is always merged into a felony, when the two meet, has been
abolished in Georgia.
I

VI.

CONSENT.

State vs. Smith, N. C., 67 S. E. 5o8. Entrapment. It is no defense to a
prosecution for an offense, not against an individual, but against the public, as
an illegal sale of liquor, that the one buying it did so not for his own use, but
with money furnished by the chief of police to make the purchase, with the
view of having the seller indicted and convicted.
139
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VII. MENTAL RESPONSIBILITY.
State vs. Coyle, S. C., 67 S. E. 24. I. Defense. Insanity, resulting from a
blow inflicted on accused by the other party in self-defense, during a difficulty
brought on by accused, would not excuse him for afterward during the quarrel
cutting such other party with intent to kill. 2. Evidence. In a prosecution for
assault with intent to kill, in which accused claimed that he was insane when
he cut the injured person, because of a blow on his head struck by the injured
person, the barbarity of accused's conduct in repeatedly cutting and striking the
injuring person was not evidence of irresponsible insanity.
VIII.

PARTIES TO CRIME.

State vs. Wilson, N. J., 75 Atl. 776. Misdemeanors. If A directs a woman
An an early stage of pregnancy-i. e., before the child is quick-to go to B to
have a miscarriage produced, which is accomplished by B by the use of instruments, A may be indicted as a principal offender under section 119 of the crimes
act (P. L., 1898, p. 827), and, upon proof of a concert of action between him
and B, may be convicted under the rule that all concerned in a misdemeanor
are guilty as principals.
State vs. Wtarady, N. J., 75 Atl. 977. Principals and Accessories. In an
indictment for having feloniously, wilfully, maliciously and unlawfully incited,
moved, procured, aided, abetted, counseled, hired and commanded A B to commit the crime of bigamy, it is not necessary to prove conviction of A B of having committed said crime; bigamy not being a felony under the law, and
therefore one who alds in its commission being chargeable as principal.
IX.

HOiMICIDE.

State vs. Blackburn, Del., 75 Atd. 536. I. Nature and Classification. Under
an indictment for murder of the first degree, the jury may convict of murder
of the first or second degree or of manslaughter. Homicide is the killing of
any human being, and is either justifiable, excusable or felonious. The taking
of human life is justifiable when done in the execution of public justice. The
taking of human life is excusable, when committed either by misadventure or
in self-defense. Homicide by misadventure, constituting excusable homicide,
is the accidental killing of another where the slayer is doing a lawful act, unaccompanied by any criminally careless or reckless conduct. Homicide in selfdefense occurs where one is assaulted on a sudden affray, and in defense of
his person, where certain and immediate suffering will be the consequence of
waiting for the assistance of the law and there is no other probable means
of escape, he kills his assailant. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of another without malice, either express or implied, and without premeditation,
and is either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary manslaughter occurs where
one kills another in the heat of blood, and usually arises from fighting or
from provocation. Involuntary manslaughter occurs where one in doing an unlawful act not felonious nor tending to great bodily harm, or in doing a lawful act without proper caution or requisite skill, undesignedly kills another.
The malice essential to constitute murder is not restricted to spite or malevolence toward decedent, but means that general malignity or recklessness which
proceeds from a heart devoid of a just sense of social duty and fatally bent
on mischief, and is implied by law from every deliberate cruel act committed
140
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by one person against another; and where the act from which death ensues
appears prima facie to have been committed. deliberately, the law presumes
that it was done in malice, and accused must show that the offense is of. a,
mitigated character and does not amount to murder. The crime of murder
of the first degree is committed where the killing is with express malice aforethought, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any crime punishable
by death. Murder of the second degree is committed where the killing is with
malice aforethought implied by law, arising as an inference or conclusion of
law from the facts found. Express malice, essential to constitute murder of
the first degree, is proved by evidence of a deliberately formed design to kill
another, and such design may be shown from the circumstances, such as the
deliberate selection and use of a deadly weapon, a preconcerted hostile meeting, privily lying in wait, or any other circumstances evincing a deliberately
formed design to kill. Murder in the second degree is proved where it is not
satisfactorily shown by the evidence that the killing was done with a deliberately formed design to take life, or in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any crime punishable by death, but the evidence shows that it was done
suddenly and without excuse, and without provocation sufficient to reduce the
homicide to manslaughter, or was done in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony not capitally punishable, or any unlawful act of violence from
which the law raises the presumption of malice. 2. Evidence. Where, on a
charge of murder, the fact of killing as charged is shown by the prosecution,
unaccompanied by circumstances of justification, excuse, or mitigation, the law
presumes that the homicide was committed with malice, and amounts to murder in the second degree, and the burden is on accused to disprove malice,
and that the killing was either justifiable or excusable, or manslaughter. To
justify a verdict of muraler in the first degree, it must be shown that accused
killed decedent with a deliberate purpose and formed design, which deliberate
purpose and formed design may exist only for a moment. To justify a verdict of guilty or murder in either degree, the prosecution must prove beyond
a reasonable -doubt that decedent died on or about the date alleged, that his
death was caused by the means and in the manner described in the indictment,
and that accused committed the fatal act as alleged. Proof beyond a reasonable
doubt does not mean that the guilt of accused or any other fact shall be established with the absolute cdrtainty of a mathematical demonstration, but the facts
must be proved to a moral certainty.
Fauntroy vs. State, Ala., 51 So., 931. Self-Defense. If defendant shot deceased under the bona fide belief that his life was in danger, and he had under
all the circumstances reasonable cause to believe he was in imminent danger,
it is immaterial whether there was such danger or not.
State vs. Jones, S. C., 67 S. E. i6o. Incitement to Suicide. Before one
who incites to suicide can be guilty of murder, a causal connection must exist
between the incitement and the suicide, and the incitement must be an inducing
cause of the crime, though not necessarily the sole cause, and where such connection is established, the inciter is responsible for the act, and is a murderer
as if he had prevailed on a third person to commit the homicide.
State vs. Bethune, S. C., 67 S. E. 466. Manslaughter. No words, however
opprobious, will constitute that legal provocation which is necessary to reduce
a killing from murder to manslaughter.
State vs. Butler, Ia., 125 N. W. 196. Self-defense. Where accused on his
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way at night from his home to a railroad station met prosecutor, a policeman,
and asked what prosecutor had said about accused's place of business, and
prosecutor provoked a quarrel by threatening an arrest of accused without
cause, the prosecutor became the aggressor in attempting to carry out his
threat, and accused was justified in defending himself.
Arnett vs. State, Ky., 125 S. W. 700. I. Voluntary Manslaughter. An
unlawful, wilful and felonious killing without malice, or in sudden fray, heat,
and passion, and not in self-defense, constitutes voluntary manslaughter. 2.
Self-Defense; Defense of Another. Where, when defendant killed deceased, he
was engaged in willfully striking defendant's brother, not in decedent's necessary self-defense, with a weapon reasonably calculated to inflict death or great
bodily harm, and from such striking defendant believed, and had reasonable
ground to believe, that his brother was in imminent danger of suffering death
or great bodily harm at deceased's hands, and defendant shot apnd killed deceased to avert such danger, he would not be guilty, provided he used no more
force than he reasonably believed at the time was necessary for that purpose.
3. Abandoihment of Difficulty; Flight. Where accused, though having begun
a difficulty with deceased, who pursued him and struck him, or struck at him,
with a weapon which was reasonably calculated to produce death or greati
bodily harm, and defendant had from this cause reasonable ground to believe,
and did believe, that he was in immediate danger of suffering death or great
bodily harm at deceased's hands, and to avert such danger he fired the shot
which killed or contributed to the death of deceased, he would mot be guilty.
X. RAPE.
State vs. Colombo, Del., 75 Atl. 616. I. Elements of Offense. Rape is
the carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her will. The force may
be either actual or presumptive; but, if carnal penetration of a female of the
age of consent is relied on, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the penetration was consummated by force and against her will, or by
putting her in fear and terror, before a conviction can be bad. Formerly it
was necessary to prove, not only actual penetration, but emissio semenis, in
order to constitute carnal knowledge: but carnal knowledge is now deemed
complete on proof of an actual penetravit. In a prosecution for rape, the
proof must be at least sufficient to show some degree of entrance of the male
organ within the labia pudendum of the female, in order to establish actual
penetravit. 2. Evidence. In a prosecution for rape, the jury, in considering
prosecutrix's testimony, should consider the time and place of the alleged
assault; and outcries or resistance made by her, or the absence of outcries or
resistance; the proximity of other people, if it appears that there were persons
sufficiently near at the time to hear such outcries or resistance, if any; and
also the time when and circumstances surrounding prosecutrix's complaint.
Where, in a prosecution for rape, a physician testified that immediately after
defendant's arrest he examined prosecutrix and found her hymen ruptured,
and that it indicated partial or complete penetration, the state was entitled to
prove by prosecutrix that accused was the only person who had ever had intercourse with her. Evidence of a physician that he examined prosecutrix two
months after the alleged offense and discovered syphilis was admissible. Evidence as to the result of a physical examination of the private parts of accused
by a physician six months after the alleged offense was too remote. Where
the state claimed that defendant infected prosecutrix with syphilis, the fact
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that evidence of the physical examination of defendant was excluded as too
remote did not entitle -defendant to the exclusion of evidence that from an
earlier physical examination of prosecutrix she was found suffering from
syphilis.
XI.

INDICTMENT, TRIAL, EVIDENCE, APPEAL.

State vs. Jones, S. C., 67 S. E. 16o. Election. Where the same offense is
charged in different counts of the indictment, or where the several offenses
charged in separate counts grow out of the same transaction, the court should
not require the state to elect on which count accused shall be tried, but should
require the jury to pass on the several counts separately; but, where the several offenses charged do not grow out of the same transaction, the proper practice is to require an election.
State vs. Anderson, La., 51 So. 846. I. Amendment. An indictment,
charging the commission of an offense as of date subsequent to that upon which
the indictment was returned into court, may be amended on the trial. 2. Bill
of Exceptions. Where, upon the face of the record, it appears that a sentence
has been imposed which is unauthorized by law, such sentence will be set aside
by this court on the appeal, though there be no bill of exception upon the subject or motion to that effect, and the case will be remanded to be further proceeded with according to law.
Hardy vs. State, Miss., 51 So. 46o. I. Waiver. An objection that an indictment is void because found by a grand jury which, according to the record,
was not sworn, is not waived by pleading not guilty before filing a motion to
quash, since permitting such motion is discretionary. 2. Quashing. Where it
is discretionary to allow a motion to quash an indictment for the non-swearing of a grand jury after a plea of not guilty, tha absence of a formal order
allowing the motion to quash is waived by failure to object. That the indictment is void, because the minutes of the court do not show that the grand
jury was sworn, may be raised for the first time by motion to quash in the
court to which a change of venue has been had.
State vs. Sovern, Mo., 125 S. W. 769. I. Surplusage. Under Rev. St. 1899,
sec. 1847 (Ann. St. i9o6, p. 1277), providing that one who shall on purpose and
of malice aforethought shoot at, or stab another, or assault or beat another,
with intent to kill, shall be punished, etc., an information charging assault with
intent to kill need not allege the infliction of wounds, but such allegation, if
made, may be treated as surplusage under section 2535 (P.
509)-statute of
jeofails-providing that no information shall be held invalid for any surplusage
or repugnant allegations where there is sufficient matter alleged to indicate
the crime. 2. Amendment. Since under Rev. St. 1899, sec. 1847 (Ann. St.
19o6, p. 1277), an information charging assault with intent to" kill need not allege the infliction of wounds, where the information wrongfully alleged the
infliction by accused of wounds on himself, it was proper to permit it to be
amended so as to substitute the name of the prosecuting witness for that of
accused. 3. Rearraigninent. Where the information was after arraignment
amended in an immaterial matter, it was not necessary to rearraign accused
under the amended information. 4. Continuance. The granting of continuances in criminal cases rests to some extent in the discretion of the trial court,
and its action will not be interfered with on appeal unless the record shows
that such discretion was improperly, unsoundly, or arbitrarily exercised.
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Edwards vs. State, Tex., 125 S. W. 894. Burden of Proof. In a trial for
assault with intent to murder, an instruction that, if from the acts or words of
prosecutor there was created in the mind of accused a reasonable apprehension
that she was in danger of losing her life or of suffering serious bodily harm,
she had the right to defend herself from such danger viewed from her standpoint, etc., and that if accused committed the assault as a means of defense,
believing that she was in danger of losing her life, etc., she should be acquitted,
coupled with a charge that an accused is presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is establishedJ beyond a reasonable doubt, was not erroneous, as shifting the
burden of proof a'nd requiring accused to establish affirmatively the facts constituting her defense.
Pqople vs. Droste, Mich., 125 N. W. 87. I. Confrontation. Depositions
taken before a magistrate at the home of a witness who was about to be confined so as to be unable to go to court were admissible in a homicide case, their
admission not abridging accused's constitutional right to be confronted by witnesses against him. 2. Impeaching. Where a state's witness denied making
certain statements to another, who was thereafter called by accused to impeach
her, the state's witness could thereafter state what she said to such other; an
impeached witness being entitled to explain impeaching testimony. 3. Striking
Incompetent Evidence. Error cannot be predicated upon the admission of incompetent evidence where it is stricken and the jury directed not to consider
it; it being presumed that the jury considers only evidence left in the case by
the court.
State vs. Jones, S. C., 67 S. E. 16o. Ruling. Where the judge cautioned a
witness to state only what she saw, if anything, and not what anyone told her,
and the witness subsequently gave hearsay testimony, and there was no motion
to strike it, the action of the judge in allowing the witness to testify from
hearsay, and in failing to instruct the witness to refrain from making statements based on hearsay, was not erroneous. Where the court directed the
jury to disregard certain testimony, unless its relevancy was subsequently shown
to the court and admitted by it, the refusal to strike from the record such)
testimony was not erroneous.
Ex parte Nesson, S. D., 125 N. W. 124. Self-incrimination. Pen. Code,
see. 16, makes all persons capable of committing crimes e=,cept those therein
specified. Section 325 defines rape as an act of sexual intercourse, first, where
the female is under 18, etc. Held, that section 325 does not render a female
uwder 18 incapable of committing a sexual crime, and hence, on the trial of
the father of'such a female for rape upon her, it was her constitutional right
to refuse to answer whether her father had had sexual intercourse with her, for
the reason that it would tend to convict her of incest, and she could not be
denied such privilege on the theory that section 325 rendered her incapable of
committing incest, and therefore her answer could not possibly incriminate her.
Ausmus vs. People, Colo., lo7 Pac. 204. Experts. An expert is one having
superior knowledge of a subject acquired by professional, scientific, or technical
training or by practical experience, which gives him knowledge not had by persons generally, so as to enable him to aid the court or jury in determining the
matters under consideration. Under Mill's Ann. St., sec. 4185, par. ii, providing that, when a written signature is required by law, it shall mean the person's proper handwriting or his proper mark, if he cannot write, and section
1746c, Mills' Ann. St. Rev. Supp., permitting comparison by witneses of a dis144
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puted handwriting with any writin- proved to the court's satisfaction to be
genuine, and permitting the evidence of such witness to be submitted on the
genuineness of the writing as well as in the absence of the statutes, the genuineness of an illiterate's signature by XX's and ++'s is the subject of expert
testimony; the signer's mark by crosses having many peculiarities.
Elliott et al. vs. State, Tex., 125 S. W. 568. Absence of Judge. That the
judge, after organizing the grand jury, left it deliberating on the finding of an
indictment, and went to another county, is not ground for quashing the indictment, in the absence of a showing of injury.
State vs. Jones, S. C., 67 S. E. 16o. Coercion of Verdict. Where the court
in a homicide case kept the jury deliberating one night and the greater part
of one day, and then charged them on the law and sent them back for further
deliberation on being informed that the jury disagreed on the facts, and indicated to the jury the great necessity of reaching a verdict, and that mistrials
ought not to occur because of the great expense involved, etc., the jury were
not coerced intq agreeing on a verdict.
State vs. Parker, N. C., 67 S. E. 35. Sufficiency. A verdict finding defendant "guilty of carrying a pistol in his suitcase" is not responsive to an
indictment for carrying a concealed weapon, and will not support conviction
thereunder.
State vs. Clark, S. C., 67 S. E. 300. Variance. A verdict finding accused
guilty of "housebreaking" would not support a sentence; not finding accused
guilty of a crime under Cr. Code 19o2, sec. 145.
Jones vs. State, Tex., 125 S. W. 914. Review. In a prosecution of a negro
for carrying a pistol, where three witnesses impeached the veracity of complaining witness and his wife, who testified, and one witness testified that accused's reputation was very good, and that he was one of the best negroes on
the creek, and accused testified that he did not carry the pistol, argument of
the county attorney that the jury would not turn accused loose because certain
white men warnted him turned loose, that in nine-tenths of the cases defended
in the county the juries were only asked to turn the defendants loose because
some white man wanted them turned loose, and as long as they parade white
men before the juries for that purpose counsel was going to tell the juries about
it, was not ground for reversal, especially where there was no special charge
requested to disregard the argument.
Wesoky vs. United States, 175 Fed. 333. Harmless Error. Where defendants were convicted on a number of counts, and the judgment was warranted
by any one of several of such counts, error, if any, in admitting or excluding
evidence relating to one count alone, is immaterial, and not ground for reversal.
Williams vs. State, Fla., 50 So. 749. Assignment of Error. A single assignment of error attacking a plurality of rulings of the trial court, whether upon the
pleadings, the admission or rejection of evidence, or the granting or refusal of
instructions to the jury, will be unavailing, unless all of such rulings grouped en
masse are erroneous, and the determination by an appellate court that one of the
rulings so attacked-is correct disposes of the assignment.
State vs. Marren, Idaho, 107 Pac. 993. Harmless Error. Even though an
instruction is erroneous and ordinarily the error would be material, yet if the
circumstantial evidence of the defendant's guilt is satisfactory-that is, such as
ordinarily produces moral certainty, or conviction in an unprejudiced mind-and
145
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the result could not have been different had the instruction been omitted, the
case will not be reversed because of such erroneous construction.
State vs. Keener, Mo., 125 S. W. 747. Information--Sfficiency. An information for felonious assault, which alleges that accused in and upon prosecutor
"feloniously, on purpose and of his malice aforethought, did make an assault,
and then and there on purpose, and of his malice aforethought, feloniously
assault" and stab prosecutor with a knife with intent to murder, is sufficient as
against the objection that the word "did" is omitted between the words "and" and
"then" in the quoted phrase, for the word "did," used in immediate connection
with the charge of assault, is carried in meaning into connection with the following clause.
Richards vs. United States, 175 Fed. 911. Appeal and Error-Reversal.-The,
overruling of a challenge to a juror for cause by defendants in a criminal case is
not ground for reversal, even if erroneous, where the record shows that the juror
did not serve, and does not disclose by whom he was excused, or that defendants
exhausted their peremptory challenges.
. State vs. Kinghom, Wash., 1O5 Pac. 234. Trial-Want of Arraignment and
Plea. That a jury is impaneled and sworn to try the cause, and the state had
begun the examination of prosecutrix before accused had been arraigned and
pleaded not guilty, was not ground for discharging the jury and declaring a mistrial; the court being authorized to require that the accused be then arraigned
and plead and proceed with the trial.
United States vs. Aurandt, N. Mex., lO7 Pac. io65. Failure to Arraign and
Plead. If after the the trial is commenced it be discovered that there has been
no arraignment or plea, it is the duty of the trial court to begin the trial anew.
State vs. Hammons, Mo., 126 S. W. 422. Indictment-Suffcieincy. An indictment for burglary charging the ownership of the burglarized store in the estate
of a person deceased was insufficient.
Warfield vs. State, Miss., 5o So. 561. Trial-Presence of Accused. The
absence of accused, on trial for murder, during a part of the time of the impaneling of the jury is fatal error.
Brunaugh vs. State, Ind., go N. E. ioxg. Indictment and Information-Certainty. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure the indictment need not be more
certain than the complaint in a civil action: it only being necessary that the allegations be certain to a common intent.
Combast vs. Commonwealth, Ky., 125 S. W. 1092. Indictment and Information-Allegatons. Under Crim. Code Proc., sec. 125, providing that an error in
defendant's name shall not vitiate the indictment, after accusing defendant Combast of the offense of illegally selling spirituous liquors, continued that "said
Burge" did unlawfully sell, etc., was not ground for demurrer -or dismissal, since
the error in accused's name may be corrected any time before execution under
such section.
Woodall vs. State, Tex., 126 S. W. 591. Verdict-Legality. In a prosecution
for false swearing, the district attorney wrote out a verdict and handed it to a
juror, who signed it as foreman, and as thus signed it was read by the clerk. The
jury did not retire or deliberate as to their verdict, nor did the member who thus
signed the verdict speak to any other member in regard to signing it. That member had not been elected foreman nor was there any consultatioff among the jury
as to the matter, though the judge, after the verdict was handed to the clerk,
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asked the jury if they agreed to it, and they nodded their heads. Held, that
the verdict was erroneous.
Harris vs. State, Tex., 126 S. W. 89o. Indictment and Information-Disjunctive Allegations. An information alleging that defendant did unlawfully
carry a pistol on or about his person is fatally defective in using the disjunctive
"or" instead of the conjunctive "and."
State vs. Clark, Vt., 75 Atl. 534. Indictment-Use of Word Feloniously.
P. S. 5983 declaring that offenses which may be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison are felonies, and that other offenses are misdemeanors,
affords no test for the requirements of pleading, and hence an indictment for
adultery, though a felony under the statute, need not allege the act to be
"feloniously" done, since by common law and by statute, intent is not an ingredient of the crime.

